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THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY TORTS:
LITIGATION AS A LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY
SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON
A NEW RESEARCH PROJECT
Deborah R. Hensler*

INTRODUCTION

On June 20, 1997, Mississippi Attorney General Mike Moore appeared before a nationwide television audience to announce that tobacco companies had agreed to pay $368.5 billion to smokers and
states to cover medical costs for smoking-related illnesses.' The settlement was unprecedented. Intended to resolve a raft of private class
action lawsuits 2 and state attorneys' general suits, the settlement, required Congress to validate agreements the lawyers had made to prohibit any future class actions and eliminate punitive damages in any
future individual litigation against tobacco manufacturers.3 As a result of the settlement, which was negotiated over three years, tobacco
companies accepted marketing restrictions that anti-smoking advo4
cates for years had tried unsuccessfully to obtain from Congress.
Plaintiffs' attorneys, in turn, accepted tort reform measures regarding
the tobacco industry that the business community had been trying un5
successfully to obtain from Congress since 1980 for all industry.
* Judge John W. Ford Professor of Dispute Resolution, Stanford Law School, and Senior
Fellow, RAND Institute for Civil Justice. Partial funding for this research was provided by the
RAND Institute for Civil Justice. Thanks to Andrea Wendt for research assistance.
1. CARRICK MOLLENKAMP ET AL., THE PEOPLE Vs. BIG TOBACCO: How THE STATES TOOK

ON THE CIGARETTE GIANTS, 220, 231 (1998). The first state attorney's general suit against the
tobacco manufacturers was filed by Mr. Moore in 1994. Id. at 30. By 1997, 38 other states had
joined in the litigation and when a global settlement was announced in November 1998, 46 states
were listed as participants. Id.
2. In 1995, a federal district court judge in Louisiana certified the first private class action suit
against tobacco manufacturers. Castano v. American Tobacco Company, 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D.
La. 1995). When class certification was withdrawn by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, the attorneys behind Castano re-filed the class action litigation in numerous state
courts. Id. at 74. By spring 2001, only one of these class action lawsuits was still pending; the
remainder had proved unsuccessful.
3. Settlement Agreement, Title VIII, "Civil Liability," B (1), in MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra
note 1, at 296.
4. Settlement Agreement, Title I, "Reformation of the Tobacco Industry," in Id. at 271-284.
5. Id. at 208-34. For discussions of the tort reform debate, see Steve Brill & James Lyons, The
Not-So-Simple Crisis, AM. LAW., May 1, 1986, at 1; Marc Galanter, The Tort Panic and After: A
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The effort to secure congressional approval of the settlement ultimately failed. But in November 1998, tobacco manufacturers agreed
to settle the litigation-without the protections against future class actions and punitive damages-for $206 billion. 6 Although the companies did not get the legal protections they had previously sought, 7 they
did agree to restrictions on advertising and sales that they had previously lobbied against. 8 In subsequent proceedings, the companies
agreed to pay billions of dollars in legal fees to the private attorneys
who collaborated with the state attorneys general on the litigation. 9
Virtually every feature of the tobacco litigation stirred controversy.
Should litigators be able to secure changes in industry practice that
state and federal legislators have repeatedly considered and denied?
Should litigators be able to impose costs on an industry that inevitably
would be passed on to consumers, in essence constituting a new tax on
smoking? Should legislators validate the results of privately negotiated lawsuit settlements? Should private lawyers reap huge profits
from such litigation?' 0
The success of the tobacco litigation was not lost on the bar. If private and public lawyers could join together to force the tobacco companies to the bargaining table,' could they also successfully take on
gun manufacturers who had joined with the National Rifle AssociaCommentary, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 1 (1993); Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, Off to the Races: The
1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REV. 207 (1990).
6. The $206 billion settlement covered 46 states. Prior to the November 1998 settlement, an
additional four states (Mississippi, Florida, Texas and Minnesota) reached separate settlements
with defendants totaling over $36 billion. See Howard Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation,
34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 11 (2000).

7. The difference between the earlier and ultimate settlement amounts suggests that these
protections were worth more than $150 billion to the companies.
8. Erichson, supra note 6, at 31.
9. Lawyers acting on behalf of just three of the states -- Florida, Mississippi and Texas were awarded $8.2 billion. Estimates of the total lawyer share of the $206 billion 46-state settlement ranged up to $30 billion. See Barry Meier, The Spoils of Tobacco Wars: Big Settlement Puts
Many Lawyers in the Path of a Windfall, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1998, at C1.
10. See e.g., Editorial, The Law Is at Risk in Tobacco Suits, WALL ST. J., April 7, 1999 at D-15.
Guns, Tobacco, Big Macs - and the Courts, 107:6 COMMENTARY. The private lawyers had negotiated contingency fee contracts with state attorneys general that promised them 10 to 25 percent
of any future recoveries. See Barry Meier, Lawyers in Early Tobacco Suits to Get $8 Billion, N.
Y. TIMES December 12, 1998, at Al.
II. Prior to the class action lawsuits and the state attorneys general litigation, the tobacco
manufacturers had waged a successful battle against plaintiffs. See e.g., RICHARD KLUGER,
ASHES To ASHES: AMERICA'S HUNDRED YEAR CIGARETrE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND
THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS, (1996); Robert Rabin, Institutional and Historical Perspectives on Tobacco Tort Liability, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE,

(Robert Rabin & Stephen Sugarman, eds., 1993).
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tion in resisting marketing and design restrictions on guns? 12 What
about health maintenance organizations, which had successfully opposed expanding consumers' ability to challenge health care coverage
decisions? 13 To some advocacy groups, tobacco litigation seemed to
offer a new prescription for pursuing social change. To some lawyers,
it opened new vistas for entrepreneurial activity.
The new suits, which I term "social policy torts," raise questions
about the proper role of public and private litigation in shaping social
policy. Should important social policy decisions be entrusted to public
attorneys general whose explicit mandate is to enforce existing law,
not make new law? 14 Should these decisions be entrusted to entrepreneurial private lawyers?' 5 Should defendants be pressed by the
exigencies of litigation to agree to settlements that require what legislatures have been unwilling to require of them? Are courts the proper
fora for social policy-making?
Whether and to what extent courts and litigation should be used to
achieve social ends are not new questions for Americans. Indeed the
civil rights movement, as well as advocates on behalf of prisoners, welfare recipients, and school children, have long sought to use the judicial process to achieve social reform goals. Today, there seems to be a
political consensus that it is sometimes appropriate for citizens to pursue social reform goals through the courts in what has become known
as "social impact litigation." But many seem to think that the claims
6
underlying the new litigation do not qualify for such acceptance.'
At the heart of the controversy over the new social policy torts is
the concern that they threaten democratic norms of public policymaking. Is there a basis for this concern and, hence, reason to restrict
or eliminate the new litigation? Or are the new social policy torts
themselves indicators that the public policy-making process-particularly the legislative process-requires reform? Civil rights litigation
12. See e.g., John Gibeaut, Gunning for Change, 86 A.B.A. J. 48 (March 2000).
13. See e.g., David G. Savage, Cost Cutting Consequences: An HMO Liability Case is Being
Closely Watched by the Lawyers Who Targeted Tobacco Companies, 86 A.B.A. J. 30 (February

2000); Kathy Cerminara, The Class Action Suit as a Method of Patient Empowerment in the
Managed Care Setting, 24 AM. J. L. & MED. 7 (1998).
14. The January 2001 confirmation hearings for former Senator John Ashcroft vividly illustrated the importance of this distinction in defining the roles of state and federal attorneys general. Attorney General Ashcroft was repeatedly asked for his commitment to enforcing laws
that his questioners believed Ashcroft opposed.
15. The leading private attorneys in the tobacco, gun and HMO litigation first built successful
practices as private tort and damage class action litigators.
16. See, e.g. CENTER FOR LEGAL POLICY AT THE MANHATTAN INSTITUTE, REGULATION By
LITIGATION, Conference Proceedings (1999) available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/misc-_la.htm.
LITIGATION: THE NEW WAVE OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED
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arose in the United States out of frustration with state and local
lawmakers who denied African-Americans equal access to education,
other public services, and the voting booth. Proponents of the new
social policy torts argue that they too are responding to a failure of
a7
government to meet its responsibilities to its citizens.
Working with the RAND Institute for Civil Justice (ICJ), I have
recently begun a study aimed at exploring these issues. In this paper, I
sketch out the conceptual framework for the study and briefly describe my research approach. In so doing, I hope to stimulate conversation and debate about the question of whether the new litigation is
indeed phenomenologically new or simply a new chapter in a wellknown story and if so, to what concerns it should give rise.
II.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK.

Damage class actions-a form of collective litigation in which one
or a few individuals or entities claim monetary compensation on behalf of a large number of similarly situated parties-have been a lightening rod for controversy over the past decade. 18 Until recently, the
controversy focused on three sorts of suits: securities class actions,

consumer class actions, and mass tort class actions. 19 Although these
class actions differ in many ways, they share two key features: they are
brought chiefly by private parties (e.g., individual shareholders or consumers) and their primary objectives are monetary compensation and

enforcement of current legal standards. 20

17. Speaking at this Conference, plaintiff attorney Don Barrett described the judicial system
as an alternative to government bureaucratic regulation. He portrayed the tobacco litigators as
"enforcing the social contract." His fellow panelist plaintiff attorney Richard Scruggs told Conference attendees that the purpose of the tobacco litigation was to raise the financial stakes for
the tobacco manufacturers high enough to "coerce" a change in manufacturers' behavior, and
noted that ongoing litigation against the managed care industry has the same purpose. Speaking
of the tobacco litigation, Mr. Scruggs said: "Our purpose was to change the world." (Notes on
conference discussions, on file with author.)
18. Class actions are also occasionally brought by defendants who choose to contest a lawsuit
collectively. Federal class actions are brought under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23;
damage class actions are brought under Rule 23(b)(3). Most states have adopted similar rules
that authorize class actions under state law. For a description of the legal framework for state
and federal class actions, see DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACrION DILEMMAS: PURSUING
PUBLIc GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 9-48 (2000).

19. Congress passed legislation to curb securities class actions in 1995. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). Efforts to reform the federal class action rule as it pertains to consumer and mass tort suits has occupied much of the
1990s and are ongoing. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 18 at 50-62.
20. The proposition that regulatory enforcement is a proper objective of private damage class
action litigation has been vigorously contested in the policy arena in the past few years. However, the historical record contains substantial support for this view. See HENSLER ET AL., supra
note 18 at 69-72.
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Damage class action critics claim that the majority of these suits are
non-meritorious and that the benefits of resolving even meritorious
suits are slim, compared to the direct and indirect costs they impose
on the economy and legal system. 2 1 They say that plaintiff class action
lawyers bring these cases simply to obtain large legal fees rather than
to right legal wrongs, and that these lawyers often agree to compromise settlements of the lawsuits that benefit themselves more than the
class members. 2 2 The poster children for the critique of damage class
actions are lawsuits that bind a vast number of class members to settlements that award the class members "worthless" coupons and release defendants from further liability in exchange for multi-million
23
dollar fees for class counsel.
Damage class action supporters respond that these suits obtain
compensation for individuals who have suffered losses as a result of
others' wrongdoing that would not otherwise be recompensed. In addition, they provide regulatory enforcement in situations in which
public regulators fail to act because of financial or political constraints
24
and they send important deterrent signals to potential wrongdoers.
They worry that horror stories about class action abuses will undermine popular and judicial support for meritorious class actions, and
25
they support reforms aimed at ending such abuses.
Recent suits against tobacco and gun manufacturers and against
managed care organizations have added a new dimension to the controversy over class actions. Because such suits rest on novel (some say
questionable) legal claims, seek enormous damages, and yield large
legal fees to the private atorneys who bring or help prosecute them,
many critics view the new suits as exemplars of the same excesses that
they associate with damage class actions. The new litigation involves a
mix of private class actions brought by private attorneys on behalf of
injured individuals and consumers, and public actions brought by state
attorneys general, municipalities, and others, often with the assistance
of private attorneys. 26 The distinction between private damage class

21. Marc Fisher, Class Actions' Big Winners: The Lawyers, WASH. POST, May 25, 1997, at Al.
22. For a discussion of the critique of contemporary damage class action practice, see HENSLER ET AL., supra note 18 at 79-99.

23. See, e.g., Reynolds Holding, Class Action Central-Hefty Costs, Slim Pickings, S. F. CHRON.,
May 25, 1997, at 7, 21; Fisher, supra note 21, at Al.
24. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 18, at 69-72.

25. Id. at 93-99.
26. Sometimes these suits are coordinated, but sometimes they are brought by rival groups
pursuing competing strategies.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:493

actions and public actions brought on behalf of consumers and citizens
27
is often lost in the cacaphony of criticism of the new litigation.
What seems to most distinguish the new tort actions from conventional damage class actions is that, in addition to seeking damages and
enforcement of current regulations, the plaintiffs seek to change the
rules that govern industry-wide business practices. For example, to
settle the state attorneys general suits against them, tobacco manufacturers agreed not only to compensate state governments for the additional medical costs the states incurred to treat smokers, but also to
adopt new advertising and marketing policies, including abandoning
the popular "Joe Camel" advertising campaign. 28 In contrast, the first
nationwide class action against the tobacco manufacturers sought
monetary damages from tobacco manufacturers for smokers and their
families. 29 While some crime victims and their families have filed suits
against gun manufacturers claiming monetary damages for personal
injuries and wrongful death, municipalities and other public entities
have sued the manufacturers seeking changes in the design of handguns (e.g., adding safety devices) and their marketing that gun control
30
advocates have been unable to obtain through legislative processes.
Similarly, while individuals have sued health care insurers for injuries
allegedly resulting from the insurers' failure to provide financial coverage for certain treatments, leading plaintiff class action attorneys
have sued managed care organizations to obtain changes in coverage
decision-making similar to those that were debated without reaching
closure in the 106th Congress. 3' In discussions with reporters and
others, plaintiffs in the new litigation say that they have adopted a
litigation strategy as an "end-run" around a legislative process that
32
has previously proved impervious to their demands.
27. See e.g. Editorial, Al Gore's Class-Action: Trial lawyers try to litigate their man into the
White House, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2000 at A18 (relating post-election litigation in Florida to
trial lawyers' litigiousness); Seth Lipsky, Editorial, The Strange Politics of Holocaust Restitution,
WALL Sr. J., Sept. 13, 2000 at A26 (discussing class action suits brought against Swiss banks by
holocaust survivors, questioning lawyers' motives).
28. MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note I at 162.
29. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995). Certification was
overturned on appeal. Castana v. American Tobacco Co., 84 f.3d 734 (5" Cir. 1996). Subsequently the group of attorneys who had banded together to bring the Castano action filed similar

statewide class actions in state courts around the country. Most of these cases have been
unsuccessful.
30. Gibeaut, supra note 12, at 48; Patrick Tyler, Tobacco-Busting Lawyers on New GoldDusted Trails, N. Y. TIMES, March 10, 1999 at Al, 14.
31. Tyler, supra note 30, at A14.
32. Id.; Paul Barrett, "Jumping the Gun: Where Tobacco and Firearm Diverge," 145 WALL ST.

J. 1 (March 12, 1999).
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Controversy over using the courts and litigation to achieve social
policy reform is hardly new. Members of the committee that revised
the federal class action rule in 1966 (Rule 23) have said that their primary purpose was to facilitate civil rights litigation. 33 In the decade
following its revision, Rule 23 was used variously to desegregate
schools, reform prison conditions, and expand welfare rights. 34 Such
''social impact litigation" swelled controversy about "activist judges"
who imposed busing plans that were opposed by school boards and
substituted their judgments about proper prison management for that
of state authorities. 35 Critics questioned both the appropriateness of
having judges who are not subject to electoral contro 3 6 make (arguably) legislative decisions and the ability of judges who were not chosen
for their managerial skills to carry out (arguably) executive activities.37 Subsequent scholarship questioned how effective Brown v.
Board of Education 38 and other landmark judicial decisions were in
39
effecting the social changes for which their advocates struggled.
The aftermath of these controversies may have contributed to Congress' decision in 1996 to forbid the use of legal services funds for
litigating class actions.4 0 Nonetheless, providing a private legal mechanism for pursuing remedies that are due under the law seems to have
33. According to committee member John Frank,
the race relations echo of that decade was always in the committee room. If there was
[a] single, undoubted goal of the committee, the energizing force which motivated the
whole rule, it was the firm determination to create a class action system which could
deal with civil rights, and explicitly, segregation. The one part of the rule which was
never doubted was (b)(2) and without its high utility, in the spirit of the times, we might
well have had no rule at all.
John P. Frank, Response to 1996 Circulation of Proposed Rule 23 on Class Actions: Memorandum to My Friends on the Civil Rules Committee, in 2 WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY
COMMITTFEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS To RULE 23 266 (Administrative

Office of the U.S. Courts 1997). As discussed in the text, Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes suits for
injunctive relief.
34. See Arthur Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality and the
"Class Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REV. 664 n. 1-4 (1979).
35. See, e.g., ROBERT WOOD, REMEDIAL LAW: WHEN COURTS BECOME ADMINISTRATORS 113
(1990) (discussing the school busing cases).
36. Of course, state judges who decide some social impact lawsuits are subject to electoral
challenge when they are required to stand for re-election, for retention, or for election to a
higher state court.
37. WOOD, supra, note 35. The latter criticism seems ironic in an era when judges are formally
educated and informally exhorted to manage their caseloads and their courtrooms.
38. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
39. See, e.g., GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991) (discussing school integration, abortion rights, and criminal law).
40. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134
§ 504 (a)(7), 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). Justifying his support for a Republican initiative, Democratic
Senator Ernest Hollings explained that "there are plenty of moneys [sic] for class actions for
these other groups" that is, from other sources, apparently referring to advocacy groups who
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become an accepted feature of the U.S. political landscape. 41 The recent decision by a New York state judge declaring the state's method
of school financing illegal vividly illustrates this. 42 The suit was
brought by the Campaign For Fiscal Equity, a non-profit organization
formed by parent-school board members and other advocates for the
express purpose of bringing the litigation. The New York Times discussed the possible ramifications of the judge's decision, quoting various local and state officials and advocates. 43 In the three articles that
the New York Times devoted to the suit the day after the trial judge
delivered his opinion, there was not a single reference'to the question
44
of whether the issue belonged in the court.
The new suits also evoke questions about whether, as a practical
matter, collective litigation can effectively serve the policy interests of
the broad constituencies on whose behalf it is brought. Recent analyses suggest that state governments are not, as anticipated, spending
the monies they obtained from the settlement of the state attorneys
general suits against tobacco manufacturers on smoking prevention
programs, but rather are using these funds to cover other needs. 45
Such analyses contribute to skepticism about the litigation, which was
supported by some public health advocates as a strategy for achieving
smoking reduction and prevention. Some of the citizens of the municipalities that are suing gun manufacturers likely oppose the gun control measures that the suits seek. These citizens were not consulted by
those who have brought the suits, although if the suits become a campaign issue, citizens may have an opportunity to express their views in
the future at the ballot box. Rather than assisting people in obtaining
more or better health care coverage, forcing managed care organizations to change their health care coverage policies could lead to higher
health insurance costs and ultimately reduce access to care for lowerhave brought class actions on behalf of low income Americans. 141 Cong. Rec. S14, 607 (September 29, 1995).
41. No one knows for sure what proportion of current class action litigation is brought exclusively to secure money damages, and what proportion implicates civil rights. Estimates of the
proportion of federal class actions that arose out of civil rights allegations in the mid-1990s range

from 12 to 30 percent. Another 10 percent or so were seeking changes in agencies' interpretation of statutes - for example, with regard to the provision of benefits. State court data are

fragmentary but the available information suggests that about 25 percent of such cases involve
civil rights allegations or suits against public agencies. See HENSLER ET. AL., supra note 18, at 53.

42. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, No. 111070/93 (N.Y.S.2d, Jan. 9, 2001).
43. See e.g. Abby Goodnough, State Judge Rules School Aid System is Unfair to City, N. Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2001, Al, B4.
44. Id.

45. See, e.g., Greg Winter, State Officials Are Faulted on Anti-Tobacco Programs.N. Y. TIMES,

Jan. 11, 2001, A20.
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income families. 46 These representation questions also arose in the
past with regard to social impact litigation. For example, civil rights
organizations and individual leaders disagreed over what strategiesbusing, political control, or school finance reform 47-were most likely
to help their constituents.
The 1960s social policy class actions and their progeny differ, however, from the new social policy torts in some important ways. First,
the "old" suits sought injunctive relief-changes in institutional policies and practices-not monetary damages. 48 Second, (perhaps as a
consequence) the lawsuits were litigated by public interest lawyers
such as the staff of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People or the American Civil Liberties Union, or by private
lawyers on a pro bono basis. The "aroma of gross profiteering" that
liberal critic John Frank has attributed to contemporary damage class
actions generally does not waft up into the air above social impact
litigation. 49 Moreover, the public interest organizations that
spearheaded the old social policy class actions were membershipbased and had deep roots in their communities. Whether or not the
leaders were as responsive to their members' desires as they could or
should have been, there were structures within these organizations to
enable communication between leaders and their constituencies.
Third, although the suits aimed at changing social policies, their legal
claims arguably derived from existing law because the plaintiffs argued that defendants were violating constitutional or statutory
protections.
In contrast, the new social policy torts usually seek substantial monetary damages, as well as changes in policy. In some instances, they
are litigated by private attorneys acting on behalf of a class who expect to win a percentage of the monetary value of any settlement or
trial award if they are successful. In other instances, they are litigated
by private attorneys (often the same class action attorneys who
brought the first suits) who are hired by public attorneys general and
other public officials to represent them on a contingent fee basis. In
both instances, the prize for plaintiffs' attorneys is valued in the tens
46. See

CAROLE GRESENZ ET AL.,

A

FLOOD OF LITIGATION?

PREDICTING

THE CONSE-

12 (1998);
David Studdert, Expanded Managed Care Liability: What Impact on Employer Coverage? 18
QUENCES OF CHANGING LEGAL REMEDIES AVAILABLE To ERISA BENEFICIARIES

HEALTH AFFAIRS 7, 13 n. 6 (1999).

47. Today we might add school vouchers to the list of social policy strategies on which groups
representing arguably the same constituencies disagree.
48. Suits for injunctive relief are brought under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
49. John P. Frank, Whither Rule 23: Memorandum to the Honorable Patrick E. Higginbotham
(April 28, 1995) (on file with the Civil Rules Advisory Committee).
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or hundreds of millions of dollars, or sometimes billions. The new
social policy torts are brought on behalf of amorphous groups or ad
hoc coalitions of advocacy organizations whose governance structures
may not facilitate communication with and monitoring of those who
are litigating on their behalf. Their aim is to impose new rules on
defendants that will govern their future behavior in the absence of any
legislative or judicial ruling that such behaviors are required. The central question for policymakers is whether these differences raise new
and important questions about the role of litigation in shaping social
policy that require restricting or eliminating such litigation, or whether
the litigation reflects significant weaknesses in contemporary public
policy-making processes that ought to be the objects of reform efforts.

III.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The research in which I am now engaged seeks to answer three
questions that are important to any future public policy decision-making with regard to the new social policy torts. First, as I have discussed, the popular commentary on the new social policy torts
frequently presents them as an entirely new species of litigation. The
commentary rarely considers the similarities and differences between
the new suits and other social impact litigation that I have suggested
exist. Instead, it analogizes the new suits to damage class actions and
depicts them as driven by entrepreneurial lawyers in search of fees.
Does the notion that the new social policy torts are fundamentally
different from other social policy litigation hold up on close inspection? Are these new suits genuine attempts to seek social reforms that
have been thwarted by the legislative process? Or are the cases simply
entrepreneurial litigation in new clothes? Figure 1 provides an initial
accounting of the differences among the three types of litigation.
Second, do the new social policy torts violate fundamental democratic norms of representation and accountability? Are representation
and accountability issues raised by the new suits substantively different from or more severe than those raised by other representative litigation, such that they cannot be dealt with by current procedural rules
and judicial doctrine (e.g., the requirement that judges review all class
action settlements for fairness)? Does the involvement of private feeseeking attorneys distort the purposes of the litigation? Is the new
litigation an effective policy-making tool-that is, do the suits achieve
their purported objectives? When litigation is used as a legislative
strategy, does the public accord the resultant policies the same degree
of legitimacy as they accord statutes enacted by popularly elected legislatures? Figure 2 sketches out a framework for comparing the gov-
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FIGURE 1.
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ernance issues raised by the new social policy torts to the issues that
long have been discussed with regard to traditional social impact
litigation.
Third, if the new social policy torts threaten important values, what
are the appropriate policy responses? Can these threats be met by
stricter implementation of current rules, such as the requirements for
class certification or the bases for awarding attorney fees? 50 Should
we restrict or eliminate these types of suits entirely? Or, if the suits

reflect failures in the public policy-making process, should we re-focus
our attention on remedying those failures, rather than decrying the
litigation?

50. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 18, at 476, 480 (evaluating alternative strategies for damage
class action reform).
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2.

COMPARISON OF GOVERNANCE ISSUES RAISED BY
SOCIAL POLICY TORTS

&

TRADITIONAL SOCIAL

IMPACT CLASS ACTIONS
GOVERNANCE ISSUES

SOCIAL POLICY TORTS

TRADITIONAL SOCIAL
IMPACT CLASS ACTIONS

VOICE/
REPRESENTATION

INDIRECT THROUGH
ELECTORAL PROCESS FOR
PUBLIC SUITS; UNCERTAIN FOR
PRIVATE SUITS

MAY BE PROVIDED BY
MEMBERSHIP
ORGANIZATIONS

PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY

IF LITIGATION IS UNPOPULAR,
MAY LEAD TO LOSS OF
ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR
PUBLIC OFFICIALS; NO OBVIOUS
PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY
MECHANISM FOR PRIVATE SUITS

IF LITIGATION IS
UNPOPULAR, MAY LEAD TO
LOSS OF MEMBERSHIP
SUPPORT, INCLUDING
FINANCIAL SUPPORT

MONITORING

MAY DEPEND ON MEDIA
REPORTING

MAY BE PROVIDED BY
MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATION

EFFECTIVENESS

UNCERTAIN

UNCERTAIN

LEGITIMACY

MAY BE UNDERCUT BY
PERCEIVED ENTREPRENEURIAL
& POLITICAL MOTIVES OF
LAWYERS

MAY BE ENHANCED BY
PERCEIVED PUBLIC INTEREST
MOTIVES OF LAWYERS

IV.

RESEARCH APPROACH

To explore these research questions, I am analyzing traditional social impact litigation, drawing on historical commentary and new case
study material, and comparing it to the new social policy torts. My
analysis of the latter draws on published descriptions of the litigation,
legal documents, and interviews with key plaintiff and defense
lawyers.
A.

TraditionalSocial Policy Class Actions

The social policy litigation that followed the 1966 revision of Rule
23 might well have satisfied the drafters' hopes. Within a few years,
the legal system was entertaining a wide variety of "social impact"
lawsuits. 5 1 Critics of the new litigation included jurists who worried
about the burdens imposed on the court system, social conservatives
who objected to the interpretations of legal doctrine that the suits produced, and some time later, scholars and activists who argued that the
suits ultimately failed to achieve the social changes they promised. 52
51. See Miller, supra note 34, at 664.
52. See, e.g., Derek Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Clients' Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation 85 YALE L. J. 470 (1976); MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED:
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Critics of the new social policy torts generally have overlooked this
rich literature.
Drawing inferences about a particular type of contemporary litigation from studies of a (arguably) different type of litigation brought
some years ago poses an obvious pitfall: if we identify significant differences between the two domains, how will we know that these differences reflect differences in kind, rather than differences in time? To
help sort out this question, I plan to conduct a small number of case
studies of recent class actions that appear to represent "traditional"
social impact litigation. My goal is to select a mix of cases that include
suits for monetary and policy remedies, and public and private plaintiff attorneys. In addition, I want to include some cases in which the
remedies sought arguably lie within the domain of legislative action
and others where the remedies might be viewed more as enforcement
of constitutional or statutory law. To illustrate what I have in mind,
here are some possible candidates for the case study analysis:
Labor Community Strategy Center v. Los Angeles Metropolitan
TransitAuthority:53 Filed in 1994 in a Los Angeles federal court by an
ad hoc coalition popularly known as the "Bus Riders Union," the suit
alleged that the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) was disproportionately allocating resources to subway and rail transit that would
serve middle-class residents, rather than Los Angeles bus transit that
serves primarily low-income minority communities. 54 Judge Terry
Hatter appointed a special master to assist the parties in reaching an
agreement, and the suit was settled in 1996 when the MTA agreed to a
consent decree that required them to reduce overcrowding on buses
and improve service. 55 In 1999, Judge Hatter found that the MTA had
failed to comply with the consent decree and ordered the agency to
purchase 248 new buses. The MTA appealed and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit heard arguments in the case in
May 2000.56
Shumate v. Wilson:57 This suit was filed in 1995 by Charisse Shumate, a female inmate serving a 15 years-to-life sentence for murder,
on behalf of thousands of women prisoners at Chowchilla and Fron(1993); ROSENBERG, supra note 40; Woo:,
supra note 36.
53. Case No. CV 945936 TJH (MCx) (C.D. CALIF).
54. See Jeffrey L. Rabin, Bus Battle Rages in Federal Courtroom, L. A. TIMES, May 3, 2000 at
B-3; Editorial, MTA Buses in Reverse, L. A. TIMES, July 26, 1998 at M-4.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. No. Civ. S-95-619 WBS JFM (E.D. CALIF).
LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT
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tera, two state correctional facilities. 58 The suit alleged that the state
provided inadequate or insufficient medical care for female inmates. 59
It was settled in 1997 by a consent decree. 60 In August 2000, prisoners' rights advocacy groups asked a judge to re-open the case, permit
additional discovery, and set the case for trial, alleging that the con6t
sent decree was based on false evidence.
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York: 62 This suit was
filed in 1993 in New York state court by a coalition of advocacy groups
on behalf of New York City school children. 63 On January 10, 2001,
Judge Leland DeGrasse held that New York state's method of financing education was illegal because it deprived city children of their
right to "sound, basic education" guaranteed under the state constitution. 64 Judge DeGrasse traced the challenge of New York's state
school financing policies to the landmark case of Serrano v. Priest65
decided in 1971.66 A week later, Governor George Pataki announced
that the state would appeal the decision. 67
Ridgeway v. FlagstarCorp:68 This case was one of two class action
suits filed by Black customers against the Denny's restaurant chain
alleging discrimination in how the company treated Black and other
minority customers. 69 The suits were settled in 1994, when Flagstar,
the parent company, agreed to pay more than $54 million in damages
to an estimated 290,000 people 70 and to provide sensitivity training to
Denny's employees. 71 A private civil rights lawyer was appointed by
the Justice Department to monitor compliance. Subsequently, customers in different parts of the country charged Denny's with continuing discriminatory practices, and the federal government investigated
58. Email from prisoners of Davis to Kelly St. John, Chronicle Staff Writer, San Francisco
Chronicle, Aug. 8, 2000 (available at http://www.sfgate.com/caibin/article.cqi?file=/Chronicle/
archive/2000/08/01/01).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. No. 111070/93 (N.Y.S.2d, Jan. 9, 2001).
63. See Goodnough, supra note 43 at Al.
64. Id.
65. 5 Cal3d 584, 487 P2d 1241 (1971).
66. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York, No. 111070/93 (N.Y.S.2d, Jan. 9, 2001).
67. Richard Perez-Pena & Abby Goodnough, Pataki to Appeal Decision By Judge on Aid to
School, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2001 at A-I.

68. Ridgeway v. Flagstar Corp., Nos. C 93-20202 JW, C 93-20208 JW (N. D. Cal. 1994).
69. David Herszenhorn, Punitive Actions are Advised in Discrimination at Denny's, N. Y.
TIMES, Aug. 15, 1997 at B-5

70. Id. See also President and Chief Executive of Denny's Resigns, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1996 at
D-1.
71. C. Ronald Petty, Diversity is Good for Business, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1996 at 1-23.
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incidents in which customers alleged that they had been harassed by
the Denny's staff. 72 In 1997, Flagstar, the parent company, sought the
protection of bankruptcy court.
Roberts v. Texaco Inc.:73 This suit was filed in 1994 by black employees who alleged that Texaco engaged in discriminatory employment
practices, including promotion and compensation decisions, job training, and other practices, against them. 74 After a disgruntled employee
who was not party to the suit produced tapes that seemed to indicate
that some executives had used racial slurs in management discussions,75 Texaco agreed in 1997 to settle the suit. The provisions of the
settlement included the creation of a $115 million fund for class compensation and the establishment of a corporate Task Force on Equality and Fairness to guide the corporation in developing and
monitoring the progress of various diversity efforts intended to assist
76
Black and other minority employees.
B.

The New Social Policy Torts

My analysis of the new social policy torts will focus on the tobacco
litigation, and suits against gun manufacturers and managed care organizations. This conference and previous symposia have produced
rich literature on the tobacco litigation. Although nowhere near as
rich, there has been extensive press coverage (particularly in the busi77
ness press), as well as some academic commentary, on the gun suits.
Like the tobacco cases, the gun litigation comprises a mix of personal
injury suits filed on behalf of gunshot victims and suits filed by public
entities. Suits against gun manufacturers, filed on behalf of municipalities, variously seek changes in practice and damages to cover public
costs associated with gun violence, such as police protection and emergency medical services, and some are grounded on novel legal theories. 78 The attorneys pursuing this litigation have said their efforts are
72. Metro News Briefs: New York; No Federal Charges in Suit Against Denny's, N. Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 1999 at B-10.
73. Roberts v. Texaco Inc., No. 94 Civ. 2015 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
74. Roberts v. Texaco Inc., 979 F. Supp. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
75. Alison Frankel, Tale of the Tapes, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 65 (March 1997); Kurt
Eichenwald, Texaco Executives, On Tape, Discussed an Impending Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
1996; Kurt Eichenwald, Investigation Finds No Evidence of Slur on Texaco Tapes, N. Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 1996 at A-1.
76. Roberts v. Texaco, 979 F. Supp, 185, 190-192 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
77. See e.g. Derrick Jackson, A Wound to the Gun Makers, Los ANGELES DAILY JOURNAL,
February 19, 1999, at 6. Barrett, supra note 32 at 1; Doug Morgan, What in the Wide, Wide World
of Torts is going On? First Tobacco, Now Guns, 69 Miss. L. J. 521 (1999); John Gibeaut, supra
note 12, at 50.
78. Gibeaut, supra note 12, at 50.
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modeled on the litigation against the tobacco manufacturers. 79 Although some of the attorneys who played prominent roles in the tobacco litigation have not joined the litigation against gun
manufacturers, 80 the plaintiffs' attorneys who filed the Castano81 class
action against tobacco manufacturers in the 1990s, led by Wendell
Gauthier of New Orleans, are key participants.8 2 Some anti-smoking
advocates also have offered their support. While noting that he and
his colleagues expected to win substantial fees if successful, Gauthier
argued that, as a result of the litigation, the gun manufacturers would
be forced to agree to regulations on manufacturing and marketing
83
that they have previously resisted.
The managed care litigation has been less extensively reported than
the tobacco or gun litigation. 84 More than a dozen class action lawsuits have been filed against managed care organizations,8 5 representing some fifty million persons in the United States whose care is
provided by health maintenance organizations. 86 Suits have been filed
both by private attorneys and state attorneys general. The class action
lawsuits generally argue that health care plans have breached their
fiduciary duties to plan enrollees by adopting various cost-control
mechanisms.8 7 Among the private attorneys involved are Ron Motley, a leading asbestos mass tort attorney, and Richard Scruggs. Mr.
Scruggs has described his role in the litigation as an effort to force
changes in health care policy that Congress has failed so far to
adopt. 88 Although a recent United States Supreme Court decision,
holding that a managed care organization cannot be sued for imposing
such constraints,8 9 is widely regarded as placing a major roadblock in
79. Barrett, supra note 32, at A-1.
80. For example, as of about a year ago, Richard Scruggs, a leading tobacco class action attorney, had declined to become involved. Among the reasons he gave the Wall Street Journal reporter who interviewed him was that he felt that guns were not "wholly bad" and he questioned
whether "there's so much money at the end of the day" [as there was in the tobacco litigation]
for a potential settlement. See Id.
81. Castano v. American Tobacco Company, 961 F. Supp 953 (E.D. La. 1997).
82. Barrett, supra note 32, at Al.
83. Id. at A-6.
84. But see, e.g., Milt Freudenheim, Under Legal Attack, HMOs, Face Supreme Court Test, N.
Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2000, at A-I; David Savage, Cost-Cutting Consequences: An HMO liability case
is being closely watched by the lawyers who targeted tobacco companies, 86 A.B.A. J. 30 (Feb.

2000).
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Freudenheim, supra note 84, A-1.
Savage, supra note 84, at 30.
Freudenheim, supra note 84, A-1.
Savage, supra note 84, at 30.
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
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the paths of these suits,90 the health insurance industry remains concerned about the outcomes of the class litigation.
C. Political Theory
At the heart of the critique of the new social policy torts, which is
sometimes obscured by more general criticism of entrepreneurial
mass litigation, is the notion that pursuing pubic policy change
through a combination of public action undertaken by executive officials and private action undertaken by entrepreneurial lawyers offends norms of democratic governance. Litigators on the plaintiffs'
side are portrayed as unfaithful agents of the public, seeking political
or financial profit. In addition, they are unconstrained by electorates
who have not requested the litigation, have little or no ability to monitor it, and little or no say about its outcome.
Questions about the public-private distinction, the proper allocation
of tasks among executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, the role of an independent judiciary in policy-making, and optimal representation strategies lie at the heart of political science and
public law. Reviewing this literature may help to put the debate over
the new social policy torts in a broader governance perspective.
V.

CONCLUSION

When viewing the new social policy litigation through the lens of
democratic theory, one must be wary of comparing real litigation phenomena to an idealized legislative process. As the ongoing debate on
campaign finance reform makes abundantly clear, there is a significant
question about whether Congress can overcome the agency problems
posed by an electoral process that relies on unregulated contributions
from well-organized and well-subsidized interest groups. Moreover,
the two-party system, operating within a districting scheme that provides enormous benefits to incumbents, itself challenges democratic
ideals of responsive government. Viewed up close, the new social policy litigation and the legislative process may look more alike than critics of the new litigation would care to believe.

90. Edward Walsh & Amy Goldstein, High Court Hands HMOs A Victory, WASH.
13, 2000, at Al. See also Savage, supra note 84.
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